

SHAKESPEARE, *King Henry V.*—Act IV.

KING HENRY.—“So if a son, that is by his father sent about merchandise, do sinfully mis-carry upon the sea, the imputation of his wickedness, by your rule, should be imposed upon his father that sent him; or if a servant, under his master's command, transporting a sum of money, be assailed by robbers, and die in many irreconciled iniquities, you may call the business of the master the author of the servant's damnation. But this is not so: the king is not bound to answer the particular endings of his soldiers, the father of his son, nor the master of his servant; for they purpose not their death, when they purpose their services. Besides, there is no king, be his cause never so spotless, if it come to the arbitrement of swords, can try it out with unspotted soldiers. Some, peradventure have in them the guilt of premeditated and contrived murder; some of beguiling virgins with the broken seals of perjury; some, making the wars their bulwark, that have before gored the gentle bosom of peace with pillage and robbery. Now, if these men have defeated the laws, and out-run native punishment, though they can outstrip men, they have no wings to fly from God; war is his beadle; war is his vengeance; so that here men are punished, for before-breach of the king's laws, in now the king's quarrel; where they feared the death, they have borne life away, and where they would be safe, they perished; then, if they die unprovided, no more is the king guilty of their damnation, than he was before guilty of those impieties for which they are now visited. Every subject's duty is the king's; but every subject's soul is his own. Therefore, should every soldier in the wars do as every sick man in his bed, wash every mote out of his conscience; and dying so, death is to him advantage; or not dying, the time was blessedly lost, wherein such preparation was gained; and in him that escapes, it were not sin to think, that making God so free an offer, He let him out-live that day to see His greatness, and to teach others how they should prepare.”


POLITICAL ECONOMY

AND

SCIENCE.

BY

JOHN HARRIS.



Montreal:


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
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TO THE
Author of the Bible,
THE KING OF SCIENCE,
AND THE SUPREME HEAD OF THE
CHRISTIAN CHURCH,
THIS BOOK
IS HUMBLY AND REVERENTLY
Dedicated.



POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SCIENCE.

PREFACE.

What is Political Economy? Is it a science? Is it a complete science in itself? Is it a sub-science or a part of science? Is it a merely arbitrary systemized collection of disorderly or unauthorized opinions, relating to a particular class of subjects? Is it an off-shoot of Metaphysics: a sort of Positivism? If it belongs to Science, what is its place and relation in respect to General Science? Has it any direct and practical value as acquired knowledge? Is it of indirect use as an intellectual exercise?

Now if we suppose a man educated only in the most rudimentary sense, eager to acquire knowledge, and ready to devote himself to the acquisition of some one or more of the Divisions of Knowledge, the foregoing are some of the questions which might not unnaturally or impertinently suggest themselves to him in regard to some of those Divisions now classed in the strictest sense as belonging to Science, preliminary to his making choice of the particular subject of his studies.

But the peculiarity in this case is that these questions, in regard to this collection of subjects (political economy), are not confined to the scientifically uneducated or par-

tially educated, but are asked by men of scientific education, and by men who have devoted their lives especially to the acquisition and cultivation of this particular Division or supposed division) of Knowledge. And these questions, asked by the men who should be themselves the most eminently qualified to answer them correctly and with certainty, are not answered by them with unanimity and accord, but, on the contrary, each eminent writer and teacher on the subject gives an answer quite at variance with the various answers given by other supposed authorities. All appear to agree that there is a Division of Knowledge to which the subjects brought together under the title of 'political economy' ought to belong as a part of Science, but that what is now included and taught under that title does not belong, or only partially belongs, to science, because the system on which the subjects are arranged is bad, and the philosophy applied to it unsound. Agreement, however, does not go beyond agreeing to reject all the systems which have been proposed as scientific. That is to say, each one has his own system which he advocates and which differs, more or less essentially, from that of each of the other writers on the subject. Such a state of matters does not prove that no actual department of Science has this particular description of knowledge for its proper and legitimate subject: nor does it prove that (so-called) Political Economy is merely a part of Metaphysics, or that its subjects are such as cannot be systematically combined as useful and valuable knowledge; but it does prove that these subjects are at present in a metaphysical and disorderly condition; that they have not as yet been scientifically arranged, and

consequently have not as yet been brought within the domain nor obtained the authorization of Science.*

The purpose of this book is to commence the arrangement of the subjects belonging to this division of knowledge as a part of General Science. Before doing so, however, we will, as an Introduction, briefly, but carefully examine the ground now occupied by 'Political Economy' in respect to the questions already indicated, and to the nature of the fallacies which, as we opine, have vitiated and rendered, in a great measure, abortive, the endeavours hitherto made to scientifically arrange the subjects.

* To this statement of the existing state of the case, as an admission on the part of economists, we should notice an apparent exception of an important character, in the case of Prof. Cairnes. That eminent writer on the subject claims that political economy, as now taught in England, includes a distinct division of knowledge scientifically arranged, *i.e.*, includes a science. He opines that this science was fundamentally arranged by Adam Smith, was substantially accepted by Ricardo, Mills, himself (Cairnes), and others; and that each of these teachers has devoted himself to the progressive improvement of Adam Smith's system. As we purpose to subject this opinion of Prof. Cairnes to particular examination, it will suffice here to say that we do not consider such claim can be upheld but that the objections, collectively, of those writers who are supposed to approve the system, to parts of it, are of such a kind as to show that it possesses no such basis and coherence as to entitle it to be considered a part of Science.

INTRODUCTION.

The immediate object we have in this introduction is to put before the reader such evidence as may be sufficient to support and establish our proposition that the subjects brought together under the title of political economy are not at the present time so arranged and combined into a sound and coherent system as to justify the claim of this collection of doctrines and opinions to be considered a part of Science.

To do this we feel sure that the plan, most satisfactory and convenient to the English reader, will be for us to quote, from the recent writings of a very eminent teacher, the conclusions which a careful consideration of the evidence has brought him to adopt, and then to show why, and on what particular grounds, we object to his conclusions as unsound.

By thus considering the conclusions and reasoning of a writer who has carefully brought together the past history of the subject and ably reviewed the works of his predecessors, we shall spare our readers and ourselves the necessity of again traversing the road and surveying the scenery with which that writer and his predecessors are supposed to have made the public familiar.

In Professor Cairnes' *Essay on Political Economy*, we find at page 254 the following :

"Let me briefly explain what I mean by this expression. (Laws of the phenomena of wealth.) It is one in very frequent use ; but, like many other expressions in frequent use, it does not always perhaps carry to the mind of the hearer a very definite idea. Of course I do not mean by the laws of the phenomena of wealth, Acts of Parliament. I mean the *natural* laws of those phenomena. Now what are the phenomena of wealth ? Simply the facts of wealth ; such facts as production, exchange, price ; or again, the various forms which wealth assumes in the process of distribution, such as wages, profits, rent, interest, and so forth. These are the phenomena of wealth ; and the natural laws of these phenomena are certain constant relations in which they stand towards each other and towards their causes. For example, capital grows from year to year in this country at a certain rate of progress ; in the United States the rate is considerably more rapid ; in China considerably slower. Now these facts are not fortuitous, but the natural result of causes ; of such causes as the external physical circumstances of the countries in question, the intelligence and moral character of the people inhabiting them, and their political and social institutions ; and so long as the causes remain the same, the result will remain the same. Similarly, the prices of commodities, the rent of land, the rates of wages, profits and interest, differ in different countries ; but here again, not at random. The particular forms which these phenomena assume are no more matters of chance than the temperature or the mineral productions of the countries in which they occur are matters of chance ; or than the fauna and flora which flourish on the surface of those countries are matters of chance. Alike in the case of the physical and of

the economic world, the facts we find existing are the results of causes, between which and them the connection is constant and invariable. It is, then, the constant relations exhibited in economic phenomena that we have in view, when we speak of the laws of the phenomena of wealth; and in the exposition of these laws consists the science of Political Economy. If you ask me wherein lies the utility of such an exposition of economic laws, I answer, in precisely the same circumstance which constitutes the utility of all scientific knowledge. It teaches us the conditions of our power in relation to the facts of economic existence, the means by which, in the domain of material well-being, to attain our ends. It is by such knowledge that man becomes the minister and interpreter of Nature, and learns to control Nature by obeying her."

We will observe in the first place that this is a part of a careful summary of his own conclusions, after Professor Cairnes has considered and reviewed the works of his predecessors. As the answer to the question in the foregoing.. "What are the phenomena of wealth?" We have.. "Simply the facts of wealth: such facts as production, exchange, price." Now to call these things 'facts' is a misnomer which if it does not result from a confusion, is sure to result in a confusion, of ideas. There is a sense in which production might be, not incorrectly, perhaps, called a natural fact: When the seeds of a vegetable are put into the ground under favourable circumstances they grow and the plants collectively produce a quantity of seed greater than was sown. This increase in quantity may be called a natural fact of production; but this is evidently quite a different sense from that in which the professor here uses the expression.

The other two things, exchange and price, are neither of them, in any sense, natural facts or ideal facts. If two men exchange their possessions it becomes a fact that they have made the exchange. Each of them might, quite correctly, consider that which he gave, as the price of that which he received, and in that sense, it would become a fact that each of them had paid a price. But what *natural* fact is involved in the transaction? The exchange may have been a good hat for an old pair of boots. Under some other conditions or relations the one item might have been worth twice or four times as much as the other, but, actually, the one party who had the boots wanted the hat, and *vice versa*; and so they exchanged.

But, it may be said, there must be some intelligible sense or meaning in which Prof. Cairnes uses the expression 'natural fact.' It may be so: the next sentence is evidently intended as in some degree explanatory: "These are the phenomena of wealth, and the natural laws of these phenomena are certain constant relations in which they stand towards each other and towards their causes. For example, capital grows from year to year in this country at a certain rate of progress; in the United States the rate is considerably more rapid; in China considerably slower." Here we find the example directly contradicting the proposition to which it is appended as an illustration. Instead of the relation being constant, the example exhibits the relation as inconstant; in neither two out of the three instances, is the relation shown to be constant. The specific gravity of water is the same in China as in Eng-

land, and the same in England as in the United States. The sun shines and the wind blows in all three countries alike. It is quite true that an effect must stand in a constant relation to its cause, whether it be termed a natural law or a phenomenon; in fact the mind cannot disconnect the one from the other. For example, gravitation causes the fall of a stone to the ground. The fall of the stone measures the gravitation, to which it has a specific relation. The fall of the stone without a cause is an idea which the reasonable mind would decline to accept. In the example given to us, the causes vary, and of course the effects must vary in correspondence. Why do the causes vary? Because they are *not* natural.

But, again—"The various forms which wealth assumes in the process of distribution, such as wages, profits, rent, interest and so forth."

We do not see how wages can be classed as phenomena of wealth, for wealth transferred as wages does not differ from other wealth: it may be any one or more of the various kinds of wealth, but it does not present any exceptional or peculiar features. We opine wages are phenomena *related* to labour or industry, if they must be called phenomena; we should prefer, however, to class them as the exchangeable value of labour: but this again would be only correct as a definition of the sense in which the expression is commonly understood. For a more strictly correct definition we would say: the expression 'wages' means the conventional price paid by agreement for labour. But to pass this over, . . . How can there be a natural law of wages, of rent, or of profits? What has nature to do with these things? Neither the wind nor

the rain receives wages. A tree does not charge rent for shading a man from the sun. The sun receives no profits or interest for all the invaluable benefits it pours down upon the sons of men. Surely there must be some grave mistake here of a fundamental character. Prof. Cairnes certainly intended to express some intelligible meaning. We will endeavour to explain the sort of mental confusion between the subjects of Natural Science and those of Ideal Science, which has evidently led to these strange statements. Let us suppose a case by way of illustration:—Some meddlesome and officious arbitrary government having determined to regulate the exchanges of its subjects, appoints officers to direct and control all kinds of barter and commercial transactions. E, an employer of labour possessed of some wealth, has agreed to hire a labourer at five shillings a day wages, but the sanction of the officer to the arrangement must be had, and he objects. 'No: four shillings a day is quite enough; let him agree to work for four shillings a day, or don't employ him.' But says E, 'I am quite willing to pay the man five shillings a day.' 'No matter, I won't allow it.' E also wants to buy a cow of his neighbour F, who agrees to sell it to him for ten pounds; but the officer has to be informed and he interferes:—'No: that's not enough. It's an object to encourage a breed of good cattle; the cow is a good cow, you must give fifteen pounds.' 'Well but,' says E, 'Mr. F is quite content to sell her to me for ten pounds.' 'No matter, you must give fifteen pounds or else go without it.' F, the farmer, receives an order from the officer fixing the price at which he must sell his milk, eggs, and butter, at only about one half the

prices which his neighbours would be willing to pay. Now, if we apprehend aright, this would be what Prof. Cairnes means by an interference with the natural law of wages and of profits. But the only connection it has with natural laws is that the God of the natural world is also God of the intellectual world. .that the God of ideal science is God also of natural science. .that He who has ordained laws to govern and regulate the phenomena of (the material world) nature, has also ordained laws to govern and control the phenomena of (the spiritual world) intellect. The employer, the farmer, and the labourer, all feel aggrieved. Why? Because the laws of nature have been interfered with? Not at all, but, because they feel and know that injustice has been done to them. The great fundamental compound fact of Ideal Science that..God is just; and..that Man has been made in the image of God; and therefore created on the basis of justice, has been disregarded. The ideal fact that arbitrary unnecessary interference with the reasonable liberty of his fellowman, by man, is unsanctioned and forbidden by the intellectual law of God, and is consequently unlawful, has been disregarded. The unlawful action of the officer, resulting from the unlawful action of his government, is, because unlawful, out of harmony with the whole of creation; with the intellectual world primarily and directly, but hence, indirectly with the natural world also. In this very indirect sense, and in this indirect sense only, the unwise and unlawful interference with the just rights and liberties of the several individuals would have a connection with

natural laws.* Let us suppose a musician playing to entertain an educated audience, and, through want of skill, carelessness or perverseness, playing so badly that the audience, instead of experiencing pleasure and satisfaction, go away displeased and dissatisfied. Would this have any connection with the laws of nature? Only the same indirect connection which we have pointed out as belonging to the previous case. The musician would have disregarded or neglected some of the laws ordained by the Creator to regulate the Ideal Science of Harmony.†

We find, however, a little further on in Prof. Cairnes' work, a modified definition which appears to recognize, in some degree, that the phenomena do not belong to natural science and they are now turned 'economic phenomena.' For example. "It is, then, the constant relations exhibited in economic phenomena that we have in view when we speak of the laws of the phenomena of wealth."

Now the relations and laws here spoken of are so imaginary and unreal, that the things specified have no absolutely necessary relation to human existence, and,

* In case the argument might suggest itself to the reader...that since God is the God of nature, all laws which belong to the general Creation may be called 'Natural Laws;' We may state, quite decidedly, that such would be false nomenclature and inevitably lead to confusion, because it would be to disregard the essential and inherent difference between Ideal and Natural Science.

† Observe that neither Acoustics nor Optics belong only to natural science. In Acoustics, Harmony which belongs to ideal science is applied to the natural phenomena of Sound. In Optics, Harmony is applied to that manifestation of force on matter, known as Light.

where they actually exist, no one of them has a necessarily definite and constant relation to any one of the others. Take, for example, a community of Indians such as is still found in the western parts of North America. There is wealth, but their possessions are confined to the weapons, utensils, and clothing necessary to support the simple industrial conditions of their existence. There are no labourers and no wages, no rent, no profits, no interest. But, let us suppose a community of Mormons, or some other community, the members of which have agreed all to share alike. .each one to do his share of work, and all the unconsumed products of their labour to belong in common to the community. After a time the community becomes very prosperous, and its possessions in cattle, grain, and cultivated land accumulate to a large amount. Here then we have human existence and the social relations of human beings dwelling together in a community, and we have wealth; but, where are the specified facts or phenomena of wealth: and where the laws and constant relations? There are no wages and no rent: truly the accumulation of wealth by the community might be considered a description of profits, but this would differ considerably from the description of profits intended by Prof. Cairnes: of 'interest' there would be none: unless, indeed, the community be supposed to capitalize its possessions and to send the proceeds to the bank—which it might, or might not be, agreed upon to do.

The concluding sentence, however, shows that the professor has altogether misconceived the relationship of

man to nature. "It is by such knowledge that man becomes the minister and interpreter of Nature, and learns to control Nature by obeying her." In respect to his merely animal nature and in his relation to nature as a variety of organized matter, man is under the laws of nature which he has to obey. A man's body, for instance, is subject to the law of gravitation; a man's physical actions are subject to the laws of mechanics. This necessary obedience of matter to the laws of the material world, cannot be avoided in any degree by the simple exercise of man's volition. But to man as an intellectual being has been given by the express declaration of God, control, within certain limitations and subject to certain restraints, over the forces of the natural world. Therefore, man, by learning to understand and interpret the laws of nature, and by learning to understand and bring himself into more perfect harmony with the laws of the intellectual world, learns to obtain a more perfect control over the forces of nature as God's minister.

In the same connection some observations of Prof. Huxley are quoted with approval, showing that Prof. Cairnes is not alone in his misconception of the relation of Man, as an intellectual being, to Nature:

"In a striking passage of an admirable address, Professor Huxley has pointed out how all true education, so far as education is an art, is but a mode of acquiring knowledge which nature herself, where we omit this means of acquiring it, is pretty sure to bring home to us after her own rude fashion. 'The teaching of Nature,' says Professor Huxley, 'is harsh and wasteful in its operation.' Ignorance is visited as sharply as wilful disobedience, incapacity meets

with the same punishment as crime. Nature's discipline is not even a word and a blow, and the blow first, but the blow without the word. It is left to you to find out why your ears are boxed.'

"The object of what we commonly call education—that education in which man intervenes, and which I shall distinguish as artificial education—is to make good these defects in nature's methods; to prepare the child to receive nature's education, neither incapably nor ignorantly, nor with wilful disobedience; and to understand the preliminary symptoms of her displeasure without waiting for the box on the ear, in short, all artificial education ought to be an anticipation of natural education. And a liberal education is an artificial education which has not only prepared a man to escape the great evils of disobedience to natural laws, but has trained him to appreciate and to seize upon the rewards which Nature scatters with as free a hand as her penalties."

What is the Nature which here occupies so strange a relationship to Man? Can it be a living intelligence, with its 'harsh and wasteful operations and defective methods?' It is, indeed, a strange relationship which is here suggested; Man, who it would appear is intellectually the superior of Nature, and who, as such, is obliged to intervene and put right Nature's 'defective methods, is nevertheless subject to Nature's laws, and the great evils of disobedience to those laws it is the object of education to teach him. The reckless manner, moreover, in which Nature is supposed to distribute rewards and punishments by no means clears up the mystery.

To suppose an electrical machine deliberately setting itself to work to educate an intelligent child, would be

simply to suggest a grotesque and absurd idea, which the mind's fancy might play with for a few moments ; but the idea of Gravitation instructing a man in science, rewarding and punishing him, becoming displeased with him and demanding his obedience, is a conception which the reasonable mind must at once reject as compounded of incongruous elements and therefore unintelligible. But what does this *nature* mean ? We feel quite sure that Professor Huxley cannot by this name intend to denote the God of Nature. If he intended to express belief in the Creator as the Supreme Intelligence, personally engaged in the education of the human race, we are confident it would be in terms quite other than these. But what, then, does it mean ? As fellow-labourers with Professor Huxley in the field of Science, we feel it our duty to point out that a precise, intelligible and distinct explanation is called for as to the meaning which this expression is intended to convey. There are those, we believe, who look, at the present time, expressly to Professor Huxley for bread ; surely this teaching, as it now stands, is very like a stone.

*On the primal basis and arrangement of the subjects of Political Economy as a Science :—*Since there is but one general Science, to which all divisional sciences belong as parts or sections, there can be but one primal basis in an absolute sense. Each divisional science, however, is relatively complete in itself and has its own primal basis, which, together with the corresponding basis of each of the other divisional sciences, rests upon the absolute fundamental fact of general science.

In purposing to arrange the classes of subjects to

which collectively the expression 'political economy' has been allotted, the first consideration is whether the collection of the subjects is sufficiently complete, and whether the knowledge we now possess of these subjects, and of their inter-relations, suffices, to enable us to carry back the generalizations of fact to the one elementary fact antecedent to all of them, and thus to determine the primal fact of the divisional science.

But supposing this cannot yet be done—that the knowledge at present acquired is not sufficient to determine the primary basis; would such circumstance necessarily prevent a scientific arrangement of the subjects? By no means; but it would prevent a complete arrangement, even in outline, being made in the first instance. To illustrate this, let us take the subjects of chemical science. These were long since systematically arranged as a science, although the ultimate generalization, through which the actual basis of the divisional science becomes apparent, has been, comparatively speaking, quite recently made, and, even at the present time, chemists can scarcely be said to have unanimously accepted and recognized the fundamental fact of chemistry, as such.*

From this example and a knowledge of the progressive advances by which chemistry, from a mere collection of facts belonging to the same division, and having a general connection in kind with each other, has become a comparatively complete divisional science, a distinct apprehension may be obtained of that approved method upon which the scientific arrangement of the subjects belonging to other divisions of knowledge has to be conducted.

* The Atomic Theory (of Dalton).

The method may be thus briefly indicated. All the known facts, belonging characteristically to the class of subjects which have to be arranged, are separated into groups, each group containing those subjects which have a manifest or demonstrable relation to each other. Each of these groups is found on investigation to have one primal or causal fact antecedent to all others belonging to that group. Now when the causal facts thus isolated are compared together, and their relations carefully studied, it becomes apparent that certain of them are particularly related, and thus a second series of groups related to each other, fewer in number and of a more primal character than the first, can be formed. Each of the groups belonging to the second series has its causal fact or general antecedent. These antecedents being compared together, as before, are found to admit of likewise grouping into a third series, each member of which contains facts having particular and definite relations to each other.

A second generalization has, therefore, been accomplished; the number of groups has diminished, whilst their primal character has increased. By the continued application and pursuance of this method, in the like manner, it is evident that eventually the actual basis, or general antecedent fact, of the divisional science itself will become known.

This method may be described as the systematic investigation of the manner in which a characteristic section or division of compounded knowledge, is compounded.

The absolutely rigorous application of the method is, however, in almost all cases impracticable, since, so long as any one group were to remain imperfect, from want of knowledge of all the facts belonging to it, the whole of the investigation would have to be delayed until the deficient facts were obtained. But the process is much facilitated, and the progress of the investigation promoted, by the aid of Theory and Assumption. Each of these is a temporary substitute for approved knowledge or for accepted fact. By their means the mind is able to experimentally complete the groups necessary for the purpose of combining into more complex, or separating into more elementary forms, the subjects belonging to the investigation.

But herein is occasion for scrupulous care, and a necessity for the observance of strict rule. The substituted, *i. e.*, the suppositious or assumed facts, and the compounded knowledge thence obtained, must be kept distinct and separate, and not be accepted by the mind as actual knowledge, until it has been *legitimately* verified. The necessary rules and systematic application of those rules are taught and illustrated in two works, one of which is of a more general, and the other of a more particular and strictly rigorous character: namely, Bacon's Inductive System, and the work called . . . Euclid's Elements of Geometry.

One unsatisfactory condition of the subjects belonging to political economy, at the present time, may be apprehended from the work of Professor Cairnes. The subjects have been separated into groups of a first

series; and in some of these, the inter-relations of the subjects belonging to them have been studied with much care and ability. Beyond this, all is confusion and disorder. Sound generalizations are mingled with theories wholly speculative and illusory. Professor Cairnes himself mistakes one of the groups; namely, that of wealth, for the whole divisional-science of political economy; and, under the impression that this division of Ideal science belongs to Natural science, endeavours with much perseverance and ingenuity to convert it into a physical science. M. Comte, the positivist metaphysician, clearly perceives that the nature of the subjects differs essentially from that of the subjects of Natural science, and, in some cases, has an enlightened appreciation of their inter-relations as subjects of Ideal science; but, then, M. Comte does not apprehend the necessity of scientific arrangement and law; considers it quite a matter for choice, opinion, or argument; and prefers, if we appreciate his doctrine correctly, that each one should be free to group the subjects according to his own liking, and to theorize, sentimentalize, or speculate in whatever manner his imagination or fancy may suggest, without any particular regard to definition or reality.

Whatever there may be of subtlety and refinement in these speculations, M. Comte is evidently forgetful that, as he recognizes no rules and acknowledges no authority, so will his successors feel themselves at liberty to accept what they like and reject what they please, of his doctrines, and that, since there is no demonstration, no basis in reality and fact, his system cannot furnish a

conclusive arrangement, nor yet furnish even the means of arriving at any such ; but must end as it begins in an unsystematic collection of imaginative arguments and barren speculations.

Having thus stated very briefly the present condition of 'Political Economy,' we will proceed to indicate the legitimate arrangement of this particular class of subjects as a division of general science.

POLITICAL ECONOMY, AS A DIVISION OF IDEAL SCIENCE.

Classification, Nomenclature, and Definition.

The subjects of Science belonging to Political Economy are comprised in the following groups: to wit,—

Government	{ Administration of Government. Jurisprudence.
Products of Industry	{ Commerce. Wealth.
Social Relations	{ Social laws and responsibilities. Relief and support of the poor. Holydays and public recreation.
Education	{ Intellectual Development. Civilization.

— — —
THE BASIS.

General Science, in the universal sense, is primarily founded upon the existence and attributes of the Creator: in the human sense, upon the declaration by the Creator that man has been made in His image, verified and demonstrated by the evidence of the divine record, by the evidence of the Natural world, and by the evidence of the Intellectual world.

This is, therefore, the absolute primal basis of each and every part and division of Science.

The immediate primal basis of Natural Science, is 'the existence and reality of matter.'

The immediate primal basis of Ideal Science, is 'the Reality and Certainty of Ideal Fact.'

The primal basis of the divisional Science of Political Economy, is 'Intellectual Existence, and the rights of Individuality.'

Hence, for a first division, are the relations of—human (ideal) Justice; Trustfulness, and Obedience to lawful authority; Benevolence and Providence; the Rights of Property; Expediency.

Upon the basis of (ideal) Justice, we distinguish:—Legislation; the administration of Justice; the administration of Punishment; the remuneration of Labour (Wages); the reward of Public Service; security of the Commonwealth (national defence, &c.); security of public and private Property.

Upon the basis of Trustfulness, and Obedience to lawful authority; we have as divisions and sub-divisions:—... The administration of Government, based on direct acknowledgment of the supreme government of God; Taxation; Collection of National Revenue; Management of the national resources; Guardianship of the national honour; National Education; Provision for scholastic education; Security of public and private Property; National profession of religion; Provision for public worship, and for religious instruction; Municipal Government.

Upon the basis of Benevolence (*i. e.*, Christian Love) and Providence:—

The provision and regulation of Hospitals; of the various Charitable Institutions; of Refuges, Reformatories; Poor-Houses and Asylums; Missionary enter-

prize; Promotion of religious and secular instruction amongst barbarous and less civilized communities. The humane regulation of Prisons; Public Baths, Vaccination and other sanitary regulations; Parks, play-grounds and pleasure-grounds.

Upon the basis of the Rights of Property:—

National wealth, and individual wealth; Commercial regulations; Money and national instruments of currency; Regulation of weights and measures; Banks; Joint-stock companies; Co-operative societies; Remuneration of active wealth (*i. e.*, interest on money); Floating wealth; Funded wealth; National capital (specie and national credit); National debts and public funds; the Labourer...his rights, claims and duties; Property in land; Relation of landlord and tenant; Rent.

Upon the basis of Expediency and Prudence:—

National Policy; National Armaments; Reservation of National wealth; National class distinctions; National Liberality, and National Economy; The precious metals as a basis of National Currency; Life and Fire Insurance, Under-writing; Sick clubs and mutual benefit societies.

To exemplify the sub-series and the sub-divisions into which each member of these groups may be conveniently separated, let us take one instance from each of the foregoing: Thus, from the first group of the primary series, the member 'Security of the Commonwealth' may include as divisions and sub-divisions—National defence (1) Military Arrangements; (a) Regular Army; Pay of soldiers; Inducements to enlist; Educational advantages; Provision for reasonable recreation in barracks and in camp; Encouragement of good conduct; Military

Labour; Temperance secured by moral and industrial education; Military Hospitals. (b) Militia and Volunteers; Importance of school drill; Beneficial effects of discipline and of military organization; Important purposes other than military (may be) thereby sub-served; Indirect educational advantage of well-ordered Militia or Volunteer service; Advantages of compulsory and free service compared. (2) Naval Arrangements. (a) The Royal Navy; pay of sailors on men of war; industrial and moral education, and arrangements for recreation of sailors; encouragement of good conduct; &c., (b) Privateer Fleet; national agreements with private shipowners in event of war. Supplementary fleet and Volunteer fleet. Occasional meetings of the ships, belonging to each fleet, for practice in manœuvring, &c.; advantages to sailors in merchant navy; educational opportunities afforded. (3) Coast defences; arsenals; war material; weapons, &c. (4) Colonial organization for military and naval purposes; Alliances with other nations, &c.

From the second group of the primary series..the member 'National Education' includes:... Religious education, secular and industrial education; national, parochial, and private schools; colleges; compulsory scholastic education; public games and exhibitions; agricultural and floral exhibitions; temperance and moral institutions; exhibitions of art and of mechanical inventions; public libraries; musical instruction (vocal and instrumental) as a part of national education; theatres; the drama; public readings; journalism; great importance of journalism as an instrument of

national education, also, as a means of conciliating a disaffected population by disseminating sound instruction.

From the same group let us take also the member 'Guardianship of the National Honour' . of which some of the sub-divisions are :—national intercourse with other nations ; national rights, responsibilities and duties ; conciliation, firmness and decision, towards strong nations ; active support and assistance of the weak nation, against injustice and oppression ; duty of upholding national rights ; unworthy fear of war incompatible with national honour ; arbitration of other nations in questions involving national honour, inadmissible ; International Law ; Treaties and Conventions.

Rights, responsibilities and duties of the nation towards its own subjects ; recognition of the right of the nation to lawfully restrain and govern each individual of its subjects, necessary to freedom ; claims of each individual upon the nation ; duty of the nation to provide the means for the subsistence and reasonable comfort of each individual ; the destitution of any one individual willing to work, a dishonour to the nation ; sufficient employment for all should be provided by indirect means ; false and sound views of national economy ; just and equitable employment of national resources ; the uses of national wealth ; the responsibilities and dangers of national wealth ; the deification of trade.

From the third group of the primary series the member 'Missionary Enterprise' includes :—Missionary education of the ignorant as a national duty ; the question whether this should be directly undertaken by the state.

wholly or partially, or left to private enterprise, stimulated and assisted by the state; missionary education authorized by the state, must belong to sound science only, but, should include instruction in the improved methods of civilization, for example, in building, arranging and furnishing dwelling houses; colonization of unsettled countries by emigration under national providence and care.

Since the example from the fourth group is the last of those we purpose to take for illustration in this place, we will endeavour to put some of the immediate relations which belong to the subjects of the member selected for illustration, with more particularity before the reader.

From the fourth group, subsection :—

‘The rights and claims on the nation, and the national duties of the Labourer.’

The first question is—what meaning is to be attached to the expression . . labourer? Every one that works is, in a sense, a labourer. But work may be either intellectual or physical; the work may be compulsory or free; it may be undertaken unwillingly . . through necessity, willingly as a pleasure, as a recreation, out of a desire to be useful, as a physical or intellectual exercise. The workman may be a highly educated and intellectual man, or may be quite ignorant and possessed of only the minimum share of human intelligence. It is at once evident that the expression labourer, as commonly used and understood, excludes most of these descriptions of work and workmen.

A labourer may be defined as one of that class of

individuals which is distinguished by having physical labour as the principal business of his terrestrial existence. The individual thus labours physically from necessity, and for the purpose of supplying the daily requirements of his life. The class he belongs to is less highly educated than the mercantile and wealthy classes of the community, and from deficiency of education is, as a class, incapable of intellectual labour of the higher description. In correctly appreciating this definition it is important to remember that the labouring class, as it now presents itself for consideration, although in a less intellectually developed condition than other sections of the community, has nevertheless progressed educationally, and, within the last fifty years especially, has done so with considerable rapidity. At the same time the intellectual development of the other sections having also progressed, the relative difference, although probably somewhat diminished, has not undergone any very considerable diminution. Let us now consider the question. . . What rights has the labourer as against the individuals collectively, belonging to the other sections of the community or nation? A very little consideration makes apparent that the answer to this question must be dependent upon, not only the intellectual relation of the labouring class to the other sections, but more particularly upon the recognition or non-recognition of the higher law by those other sections. Let us for the moment suppose the intellectual relation to be on the part of the labouring class, that of human intelligence almost wholly undeveloped by education, and on the part of the other sections an intelligence highly

developed; and let the supposition include non-recognition of the higher law. How, on such a supposition, would stand the *rights* of the labourer? The right would then be the *right* of *might*; and, since merely physical strength is incapable of contending with or resisting successfully intellectual strength, the *right* would be with the more highly developed intelligence. The *right* of the labourer would be but little more than a *right* to live. The remuneration of his labour would be barely sufficient to provide the absolute necessities of his daily existence and to enable him to go through his daily toil. If he complained, more work would be put upon him and exacted; if he resisted, increased severity and hardship would be the result. Has not the world ere now exhibited a state of things not much unlike this? Not only of this or that particular nation, but of every quarter of the globe, and of every country—the historian tells of a time when the condition of the labourer has been that of serfdom and slavery.

But the higher law—the law of divine Justice—the law of Christian love and charity—intervenes and is recognized. The labourer is no longer the serf or slave, but the fellowman, less fortunate than his richer brother because less favoured with the gifts and blessings of Him who giveth to each one as He sees good; and requiring the guidance and assistance of his intellectual neighbours because without the advantages of education. What are now his *rights*? In proposing this question, another suggests itself: Does he himself recognize and accept the higher law? If he wish to have the benefits and advantages conferred by it, is it not reasonable that he should

also undertake the duties and responsibilities belonging to it? Is he trustful in those who have benefited him? Does he endeavour to fit himself for the privileges and duties of a higher condition? Is he unselfish and sympathizing towards those less fortunate than himself? Does he with patience and forbearance endeavour to assist those who endeavour to assist him? If he does so recognize the higher law, and thus fit himself for a more intellectual condition in life, then his *right* will be to possess and enjoy the advantages belonging to such condition. But if, on the contrary, he does not recognize the higher law and says within himself, 'that man is richer than I am; he is keeping my property from me; I have as much right to it as he has; all men are born equal:—let us combine to take this wealth away from the rich and divide it amongst us.' In such case the higher law would become abrogated, and the terrestrial law of man's natural existence would again come into full force—that terrestrial law of God, which gives to intellectual strength the dominion over the whole Creation of the natural world.

Let us now, assuming that the higher law is fully recognized and that, by endeavouring to qualify himself, the labourer has become entitled to the full benefits of the higher law, consider what modifications could be most readily made in the existing conditions under which the life of the labourer in the most civilized countries is now passed, which would enable him to take a larger share in the advantages and pleasures belonging to the intellectual existence. The conditions, broadly stated, which on a general survey of the circumstances, appear to bar

the way to any immediate improvement of more than a slight character, are these: For six days in the week the labourer's work has to be almost incessant. To fulfil the requirements of his physical existence—to sleep and take his meals—besides his work, occupies almost the whole of his time. The seventh day is a day of rest; but it is a day to be especially devoted to the remembrance of Him and of His benefits by whom it has been appointed, and to that rest, from work of all kinds, by which the completion of the great work of Creation is to be commemorated.

In remuneration for the six days almost incessant labour, the wages received by the labourer barely suffice to defray his current expenses and to provide, perhaps, if he be very provident, a fund for old age, sickness, or other emergency.

If the desired improvement consisted simply and solely in reducing the hours of labour, so as to give the labourer, let us say, a second day out of the seven for intellectual improvement, or the equivalent of this in a reduction of about 2 hours daily, the alteration might be readily effected. But it is requisite for the labourer to get, at least, the full amount of wages, which he now receives for the longer period of work. If it be proposed to make the alteration by paying him the same amount in wages for the shorter time, an objection is very forcibly stated by the employer of labour; namely, that this would be equivalent to paying a higher rate of wages, and would be either more than his, the employer's, profits would afford, or else, would oblige him so to increase the price of his farm-produce, or his manufactured pro-

duct, that he would be no longer able to meet his rivals in successful competition. This objection, so stated, appears for the moment very formidable, if not fatal to the proposed alteration; but we observe that the objection rests on the assumption that a competition with other produce or products must be sustained, in which competition, having the advantage in this respect, the opposing competitor would be on an equal footing in regard to the other circumstances. Is it certain that such assumption must be admitted, as necessitated by the conditions of the whole case? We opine that it is not. In the first place, the competitor or competitors, referred to, must be outside the nation, for, otherwise, the objection would not apply, because the supposition is that such an increase in the rate of wages would be general throughout the nation. But then, if the competition be with competitors outside the nation, and the alteration be one which it is to the interest of the nation to make, the question arises—whether the nation cannot yet make the alteration, and so support its own manufacturer (or farmer) that the foreign competitor could still be advantageously met. Supposing, for example, the nation in question to contain a considerably greater number of labourers than sufficient to supply the labour market at the longer time of work (and therefore lower rate of wages). It is evident that, since the superfluous number of labourers must live, and have no resources of their own,* their mainte-

* We do not wish to complicate the argument, but, strictly speaking, if they had resources of their own, these would be a part of the common resources of the nation, and the conditions of the case, in respect to the more general argument, would be essentially unaltered.

nance must be in some way supported by the nation. Herein would be a set-off, so far as it might go, furnishing the increased number of labourers without, perhaps, any absolute increase in national expenditure, because, under the alteration, the nation would pay in wages merely what it had previously paid in poor-rates or in some other such form. But, leaving aside the equalizing effect which would arise from thus furnishing the means of self support to labourers previously supported by the nation, let us suppose the nation to possess accumulated wealth to an exceedingly great amount, and to be in receipt of an annual income on a correspondingly great scale, it is evident that the nation might if it thought proper, and saw its advantage in so doing, reimburse its own manufacturer the increase in his expenditure occasioned by the employment of the greater number of labourers; and thus place him in a position to compete with his foreign rival equally favourable to that which he occupied previously. For example: The nation may, through its government, relieve the manufacturer competing in the foreign market, of all taxation, or of such a part of the taxation to which he was previously subject, as to equalize his profits. And, again, if the foreign manufacturer should come into the home market, the nation could readily equalize the competition by imposition of an import duty. In this last case the price of the article would be, of course, increased; but that would not necessarily, be a circumstance of any consequence to the nation, because the additional price would go to its own labourers, that is, would be paid to itself.

The alteration would, in fact, constitute an indirect

method of finding employment for the additional labourers, and providing the payment of the wages by the nation at large; the difficulty about the competition from outside would be surmounted, and the question only remains whether the benefit thus bestowed upon its labourers by affording them opportunity of intellectual improvement, greater enjoyment of their lives, and, also, by furnishing the means of self support to a greater number would not be, on the part of the nation, a worthy, rightful, and every way beneficial mode of employing a part of the wealth entrusted to it.

In stating, however, as we have just done, that it would be equivalent to the payment of the wages of a certain number of workmen, to them, by the nation,—we mean that it would be so, compared with the state of things previously existing. But it by no means follows that it would be correctly considered as in any degree an act of romantic liberality or unfair favouritism towards the labourers, and still less as a sort of charitable gratuity on the part of the nation. The labourer would be, we opine, quite as honourably entitled to his wages at whatever increased rate the nation might see well (by diminishing the hours of labour) to fix the amount, as if he, under the compulsion of necessity, were obliged to work for a much less sum.

To fully appreciate the whole case, however, it is necessary to apprehend distinctly, and to bear in mind, the uses of wealth, whether possessed by the one individual or by a nation of individuals; at the same time, remembering that wealth, which merely passes out of the hands of certain of those individuals into the hands of cer-

tain others of them, is neither lost nor gained by the nation. To illustrate this by an example, let us suppose, in the government shipyards of England, a large increase to be suddenly and quietly made in the rate of remuneration paid to all those engaged in the construction of the ships belonging to the Royal navy, and that several ships have been completed under the advanced rate before the increase in the pay attracts public notice; the case would be very probably brought under the attention of the public as a statement that each ship had cost the nation just so much more as the increased rate of remuneration had exceeded that formerly paid; but such a statement would be evidently quite incorrect, because the individuals who had received the increased amount belong to and form part of the nation; the money would not have been spent by the nation at all, but merely have changed hands. The actual cost to the nation would be measured by the quantity of work expended upon the ships, quite independently of the monetary valuation attached to it. It would be a certain fraction of the entire working power and intellectual ability of the whole nation, which had been expended, and whether the individuals actually employed worked without any remuneration, whether they received five shillings, five pounds, or fifty pounds each per day, would make no difference whatever in the cost of the ships to the nation, so long as the individuals belonged all of them to the nation, and the money paid to them (or its equivalent) was not sent away from the country. Any such transaction might, of course, involve unfairness and injustice to others of the individuals composing the nation, but that is not here the question.

We have, however, in the next place, to consider a question of justice and injustice to individuals, in the application of wealth possessed by the nation. Let us suppose the whole of the individual components to be divided into three classes unequal in numbers; a first class A; a second class B, much more numerous than A; and a third class C, much more numerous than B. The individuals composing the class A, we will suppose to be possessed of great wealth, able to spend the whole of their time in intellectual pursuits, in pleasure or in idleness. The individuals of the next class, (B), we will suppose to be engaged in trade, commercial occupations, manufacturing enterprises and professions, in which pursuits they have to labour intellectually and in a lesser degree physically, but they are able to surround themselves with the comforts and refinements of civilized life, to rest from their labours at intervals, and, usually, for the later part of their lives, to cease from labour and live in rest and comfort; leaving at their deaths an accumulation of wealth to their successors. The third class C, have to labour physically almost incessantly; they are excluded from intellectual pleasures and from most of the comforts of civilized life. They are unable to accumulate any wealth, and are able to provide only for the daily expenses of their lives. Now the three classes take stock together, as a nation, collectively, of their possessions, their wealth, and their income; Class C, then, addressing the other two classes, says to them. . 'Well, it appears that we possess an enormous amount of accumulated wealth; our annual income is so large as to seem almost fabulous: now you, Class A, have really

a larger share of this wealth and revenue than you well know what to do with ; and you, Class B, are receiving more than sufficient to enable you to enjoy all the comforts, luxuries and refinements of civilized life, and to provide a fund for your successors. Let us agree to make some little alterations in the arrangements, so that for the future our class may receive somewhat more, and yours somewhat less.' If A and B were to answer them:—'Oh ! what you propose is entirely out of the question : why we should all go to the dogs together. We should be no more able to compete with the foreigner : the trade of the country would be ruined.' It seems to us that it would be open to Class C, to respond : 'Not so ; it is simply a question between ourselves. Our having a somewhat larger share, and your having less, will not prevent our competing with the foreigner. We shall still be able to do all the work there is to be done, just as well and better than heretofore, but we would like to have a little more time to attend to other things besides work, and for the enjoyment of our lives.'

In thus pointing out that the question of fixing the rate of the labourer's wages, is, or may be made, one of willing agreement, that if the wealthy and the very wealthy classes choose to give up, respectively, some part of that share which is now conventionally considered to belong to them, in order that the other class, which can scarcely be said to receive at the present time any share of the profits, may receive some part of them, we may express the opinion that, under such an alteration, the two wealthier classes would not necessarily find their respective incomes actually diminished excepting

temporarily and for, perhaps, only a very short time. There are many sources of expense, in the sense of loss, to the nation, which, under such modification in the distribution of the national wealth, might be much diminished and in some instances entirely removed : For example, poor-rates, work-houses ; prisons ; strikes.

The relation of the labouring class to the wealthy class in the nation, may be compared, and is very similar, to that of the employed, in a large manufacturing or other business, to the employer or proprietor of the business. It is evident that if, supposing the proprietor to be in receipt of very large profits, he chose to divide a part of those profits amongst those employed in the business, the business would not be thereby rendered less prosperous. On the contrary, those upon whose labour being well done much of the success of the business might be dependent, having come to possess a direct interest in the prosperity of the business, would do their work with greater attention, good will and energy ; and it is not too much to suppose that instead of diminishing, the prosperity of the business might so much augment as to give the proprietor individually as large an income as he received when he took the whole of the profits to himself.

We are quite aware of the argument that labour is a commodity which comes into the market of the world and finds its proper *natural* price. Now in considering the relation of labour, under particular and definite conditions, to certain other things, as the relation of one element to certain other elements where the restricted conditions of the case are fixed and determinate, such an

estimate of the relation of labour may be not erroneous, but substantially sound and useful. It must be carefully remembered, however, that the preliminary question is as to the conditions. A labourer is a human being, not a mere labouring machine, and there is no primal necessity why he should do nothing but labour. So soon as the ground is thrown open, and the general case surveyed, the theory of a natural labour market and a natural price of labour, stands condemned, at once, as artificial and unsound when applied to the general case. For example, in a given country N, there is a total average quantity of work to be done, necessitating the employment of a proportional quantity of labourers. The available labourers in the country are numbered, and the number found to be ten thousand times X. This number is to be neither increased nor diminished by immigration or emigration, and the labour is to find its own *natural* price in the market. Yes : but, how long per day are the men to work ? What is the agreement, sanctioned, authorized and defined, by the law of the country or the conventional law of custom, as to the hours of labour ? For, evidently, if the men are to work 18 hours a day, there may be many more than sufficient of them to do the required work : the competition between them will considerably reduce the market value of their labour. On the other hand, if the men are to work only 9 hours a day, the number will be practically diminished to the one-half ; there may be now much fewer than sufficient to do the whole of the work ; they will be in consequence greatly in demand ; there will be no risk of their being left without work, and the market price of their labour will, by the urgency

of the demand, be considerably augmented. This example may serve also to make apparent the circumstance, that a community of any dimensions, from that of a small town to that of a great nation, wherever the number of the labourers is not subject to any great and sudden fluctuations, has in its own hands the means of proportioning the number of the labourers to the quantity of the work, if so be that the number of them is sufficient or in excess. For, let the case be that of a town, and the conditions such that, in consequence of some unfavourable outside influence, a general depression of trade for instance, there is a considerable diminution in the quantity of work to be done within the town, whilst the number of the labourers remain as before; the *natural* effect (to use a phrase very objectionable in such connection) is that the rate of wages becomes reduced. . many of the labourers are left without work, and they and their families have to be supported in a state of destitution, perhaps, by charitable or outside aid. Now let us suppose that the mayor, or other appointed municipal authority, makes lawful public declaration that the hours of labour shall be reduced; and shall be henceforth one, two, or three hours per day (according to the circumstances), less than previously; such regulation to remain in effect until lawfully repealed. Such a proceeding would be obviously obnoxious to the objection that it would be oppressive and unjust to the employers of labour. 'Here are the employers of labour,' it might be said, 'whose business is depressed, who in some cases are making little or no profit, and in others are losing money; and you propose to arbitrarily put upon

them the burthen of supporting these labourers. Why! the effect would be to ruin many of the employers and to throw the business of the town into confusion.' Yes: if that were the whole of the proposition and nothing more belonged to it as a necessary part of the proposed action, we quite admit that such an effect would be likely to result. But why should not the mayor make declaration, at the same time, undertaking on the part of the town to repay the employers of labour the equivalent to the wages received by the additional men employed, out of the general municipal funds. 'Oh! but that would involve complication and give trouble.' No doubt; but then does not all business involve complication and give trouble? If the great object of our lives were to avoid complication and trouble, it would be most reasonable to do as far as possible without business and to live Indian-fashion, satisfied with supplying the bare necessities of life by the most ready and simple means. The question is not as to complication and trouble, but as to whether it would be the most just, equitable, enlightened Christian arrangement, and the arrangement most salutary and beneficent to all parties, or whether it would not. Why! in equity and justice, should not a portion of the resources of the whole town. . of all the inhabitants collectively. . be applied to meet such an adverse fluctuation in the prosperity of the town? Why should the labouring population be, as it were, held responsible and made to suffer the consequences alone? It may be said, perhaps, that the employers also suffer from such a depression of trade, or from such unfavourable fluctuations in the prosperity of

the town. But such allegation is not practically and really true, excepting in cases of improvident reckless speculation, or of exceptional misfortune, in which the employer may have to succumb to the unexpected or overwhelming pressure, and to lose whatever he may have possessed invested in his business : in all other and ordinary cases the employer of labour, whether tradesman, wholesale dealer, manufacturer or farmer, averages the profits and losses of his business, allows a margin for the occasional consequences of adverse fortune, puts a favourable season against an unfavorable, a period of unwonted activity in the demand for his produce or products against a corresponding period of unusual depression. It is true that if the labourer survive until the favourable season arrives, he will again be able to obtain full work and to live for a time in comparative comfort ; but then he and his family may in the meantime have starved, or he may have survived with his health so shattered and strength so reduced by the hardships he has had to undergo, that he is no longer able to take advantage of the more favourable circumstances when the storm is over and all is again sunshine and fair weather.

In the case of the town, as we have already remarked in the case of the nation, thus regulating and adjusting the hours of labour and employing a portion of the municipal funds for that purpose, the town . . . i. e. the inhabitants of the town collectively . . . would not be in any degree impoverished or rendered poorer. No wealth would be lost, no money would have to be paid away ; it would be a question of internal economy only ; a question simply of a modification in the distribution of a part of the

wealth possessed by the inhabitants, collectively, amongst those inhabitants. On the other hand, the town would certainly gain by the avoidance of loss; by the avoidance of crime and breaches of the law consequent upon men being subjected to conditions of extreme hardship and want; by the avoidance of sickness and death consequent upon men being subjected to conditions under which proper care of the bodily health and attention to sanitary rules become impracticable. Small-pox, fever, cholera, words of dire import, have an evidently very close connection with the subject, and should have their place in the consideration of the policy of choosing the *laissez-faire* plan, on the one hand, or the method authorized and commended by the Science of Political Economy, on the other.

The very partial development which the subject of this one subdivision has now received, may suffice to exemplify the precise nature, as well as indicate the quantity of work requiring to be done, before the science of political economy can be considered as arranged with that degree of imperfect completeness to which other divisions of knowledge have already attained. There is, however, no small quantity of good material prepared as it were for arrangement; requiring only to be extricated from its present surroundings and put into the right place. As in the time of Francis Bacon, much sound and useful knowledge belonging to Chemistry and Astronomy, was rendered of no practical utility because included in the unsound and unscientific systems of Alchemy and Astrology, so at the present time, in the manifold writings on subjects belonging to


political economy, are to be found many instances of sound induction, reasonable and true in themselves as detached links, but at present useless and unfruitful because intermingled with metaphysical arguments, illegitimate doctrines, and disorderly opinions. The almost unanimous dislike, suspicion and distrust (very significant in itself) which Professor Cairnes, somewhat pathetically describes as existing on the part of educated men to what he supposes to be the science of political economy,* thus becomes explained and elucidated.

We have just mentioned the words suspicion and distrust; let us, in concluding this introduction of the Science of Political Economy, remark the great and all but insuperable obstacles to the practicable application of the beneficent lessons taught by that science, represented by these two words. Faith, which in a scientific sense may be defined as reasonable trustfulness, cannot, with strict correctness, be considered a primal basis, because itself a consequent to, and dependent on, Belief. But the importance of the part played by trustful-faith, as a substitute for belief, in human science, can be scarcely over-stated. Let there be trustfulness between the Governor and the governed: confidence on their part that he has their interest at heart and is endeavouring with earnest desire to benefit them; confidence on his, that they whom he governs will appreciate whatever he endeavours to do for their benefit, in a grateful and sympathizing spirit; and then the machinery of government works smoothly, and all goes well; but let doubt, sus-

*Essays on Political Economy, pages 232 to 236.

picion, distrust, come between them; and then all is difficulty, discontent, and trouble.

Truly when Eve brought Seth into the world, she might well console herself with the apprehension that God had, in him, given her a substitute for Abel whom Cain had slain.



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